Price and investment equations are estimated using a unique data set for Swedish manufacturing plants. The empirical specification is based on a theoretical model of a financially constrained firm selling its output in a customer market. We find that, as predicted by our theoretical model, prices respond strongly to cost shocks but are not much affected by variations in demand and high predetermined investment is associated with a higher price.
Introduction
How prices adjust to cost and demand shocks is important for the analysis of business cycles and the transmission of monetary policy. Much empirical research on price dynamics has been pursued using data on high aggregation levels. While macro-econometric studies of price dynamics are important to get the broad picture, aggregation bias might influence the results and affect our conclusions regarding economic behavior at the microeconomic level.
In recent years, the availability of more disaggregated data on prices has increased, which has led to a number of micro data studies of pricing behavior. Many of these studies focus on the question of sticky prices by investigating the frequency and distributions of price changes.
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Few micro data studies have attempted to investigate the determinants of prices by estimating structural price equations derived from explicit theoretical models. This is surprising, since a number of ''puzzles'' emerge from aggregate studies, and these puzzles can be examined more closely using data on the level were price decisions are actually made. A typical finding is that demand shocks have small effects on prices.
2 With a slowly changing capital stock and approximately constant returns to scale, marginal cost should increase with production. Hence the absence of demand effects on prices is inconsistent with price adjustment in a perfectly competitive product market, or a market where the markup on marginal cost is fixed.
Menu costs may be a reason for sluggish price adjustment when demand changes, but at the same time, many studies find prices to respond strongly and quickly to cost shocks.
Apparently, adjustment costs do not hinder significant price adjustment when there are changes in costs. To understand price adjustment, we need to estimate explicit theoretical models using microeconomic data.
In this paper we estimate structural price and investment equations on a large data set for manufacturing plants. The data source is unique; it provides a wide coverage of prices at the plant level in Swedish industry and is not limited to price data for a certain branch or a small number of products as is usual in micro data studies of pricing behavior. 1 See Bils and Klenow (2002) for an overview and investigation of sticky prices using micro data. 2 Bils and Chang (2000) review this literature and provide evidence for U. S. industry data. Shea (1993) found that prices do rise with demand, but with a considerable lag. 3 As will be explained below, these prices are constructed by Statistics Sweden using a mixture of plant specific unit values and very disaggregate producer price indices.
The empirical specification is based on a dynamic model of a financially constrained firm operating in a customer market, developed by Bucht, Gottfries and Lundin (2002) . 4 The price equation that comes out of this model includes costs and demand, but also an important interaction between investments and prices. According to the model, prices respond quickly and strongly to changes in wage costs but are not much affected by demand, and high investment tends to raise the price.
The intuition behind these results is the following. Because of customer relations, the market share is an important asset for the firm, and the decision to invest in market share (by charging a low price) is a dynamic investment problem. Investment in real capital is predetermined (time to build). A positive demand shock implies higher marginal cost at the initial price, but higher demand also increases profits, and this gives the firm financial resources to invest in customer stock by lowering the price. For reasonable parameter values, these two effects largely cancel out, and hence the price responds very little to demand in the short run. A cost shock, on the other hand, leads to higher marginal cost and lower profits, and both effects induce the firm to raise the price. This explains the differential effects of demand and cost shocks on the price.
The positive relation between investment and prices arises because investment in capital stock and investment in market share compete for limited financial resources when the firm is financially constrained. When substantial financial resources are tied up in ongoing investment projects, there is less room to cut prices. When demand turns down, investment cannot be stopped immediately, and the firm may end up in a financial squeeze where it is forced to set a high price. This is a new and testable prediction, which differentiates our theoretical model from other explanations of countercyclical markups such as Bils (1989) , Rotemberg-Saloner (1986) and Rotemberg-Woodford (1992) , Bils and Chang (2000) .
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The data at hand enables an empirical investigation of the implications of the model at the level for which the theoretical model is constructed. As predicted by the model, we find that higher wage costs raise the price at the individual plant but demand factors have small effects on the price. In fact, there is a small negative price response to demand shocks: markups are even more countercyclical than our theoretical model predicts. Investment in capital stock is found to have a significant positive and quantitatively large effect on the price.
Our paper adds to a small literature documenting effects of financial variables on prices.
This literature includes Chevalier and Scharfstein (1996) , who found that financially constrained supermarkets set higher prices, and Asplund, Eriksson and Strand (2001) , who found similar results for newspapers.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we briefly outline the theoretical model underlying the price and investment equations to be estimated. In Section 3 we present the data and the definitions of variables and this is followed by the empirical specification in Section 4. The results for the whole sample are presented in Section 5 and some sensitivity analysis is done in Section 6. In Section 7 we divide the sample according to size, capital intensity, and indebtedness, and compare the results for different groups of firms. Section 8 concludes.
Theory
The basic theme in the customer market model, originally formulated by Phelps and Winter (1970) , is that firms face a trade-off between attracting new customers and exploiting existing customers. When customers are imperfectly informed about prices in the market, they tend to return to the same firm, and the stock of customers changes slowly. This gives firms a degree of market power over their current customers. 6 The customer stock (market share) is an important determinant of future profits, and in order to maintain or increase its customer stock, the firm sets a lower price than the one which maximizes current profit.
Another starting point of the analysis is the large theoretical and empirical literature arguing that capital market imperfections prevent cash-constrained firms from making valuable investments. 7 Financial constraints may limit investments in market share just as they limit investments in real capital. Firms may be forced to set higher prices than they would do without the financial constraints.
In an earlier paper we constructed a dynamic optimization model of a financially constrained firm operating in a customer market (Bucht, Gottfries and Lundin (2002) ). The firm has two assets: a customer stock and a capital stock. Because investment takes time (time-to-build) investment in the capital stock is predetermined. We show theoretically that there may be important interactions between investments in the two stocks. In order to finance ongoing physical investment, the firm may be forced to cut investment in market share by raising the price. Here we briefly review the model which forms the theoretical starting point for our empirical investigation.
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The dynamics of the customer stock is modeled as a customer flow that depends on the price charged by the firm, t P , relative to the average market price,
(1) t X is the firms' customer stock and each customer buys t Y units, so demand is
To model financial constraints in a simple way, we make three assumptions: i) the firm is unable (or unwilling) to issue new shares, ii) the manager dislikes fluctuations in dividends, and iii) the firm cannot borrow unlimited amounts in the financial markets. 9 More specifically, the firm is able to borrow up to a fixed fraction θ of the capital stock and the parameter values are such that this borrowing constraint always binds. The preference for smooth dividends is captured by assuming that the manager maximizes the discounted sum of current and future utility where utility is a concave function of dividends:
where t D is real dividends and β is a discount factor. Production function takes the CES form in capital, t K , labor, t L , and an exogenous productivity shock, t A :
Real dividends are given by 8 The present model includes adjustment costs for investment which were not included in Bucht, Gottfries, Lundin (2002) . 9 Well known reasons why new share issues may be an unattractive form of finance are the loss of control this implies for the existing owners and adverse selection problems. The preference for smooth dividends may arise because dividends work as a signal of future profitability to imperfectly informed shareholders, making managers reluctant to cut dividends. Alternatively, the manager may be the owner, who lives on the dividends. If
where t W is the wage and θ is the fraction of investment which is financed by borrowing.
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The first term is revenue minus the cost of labor, deflated by the market price index 0 t P . The second term is the fraction of investment that is financed by retained earnings and the third and fourth are is replacement investments and capital adjustment costs.
11 The final term is real interest payments; the relevant real rate of interest, r , is taken to be constant.
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Time to build is captured by assuming that the capital stock is predetermined. In period t, the manager decides about price (or equivalently the customer stock) in period t and investment in period t+1 so as to maximize the utility of the dividend flow. 13 The resulting
Euler equations characterize the optimal paths for the customer stock and capital stock.
Bucht, Gottfries and Lundin (2002) potential lenders are poorly informed about the firms' business opportunities and the risk involved in investment projects, they will typically require tangible assets as collateral in order to lend to the firm. 10 To simplify the model, we take the deflator for dividends and the price of capital goods to be equal to the market price, 0 t P . Without this assumption, the price equation would contain several relative prices, which would be difficult to separate empirically. 11 We do not allow for fixed adjustment costs or irreversibility. Both are likely to be important but they would make the model much more complicated. Hopefully, our simple quadratic adjustment costs can still capture the average effects of adjustment costs. (See Carlsson and Laséen (2003) for evidence of lumpiness and irreversibility in Swedish investments.) 12 The interest rate is the same for all firms in a given year and the number of years is small. In some empirical specifications we include time dummies which capture all common shocks including the interest rate. 13 In the theory and baseline estimates, we do not allow for nominal price stickiness. In the sensitivity analysis we allow for sticky/predetermined prices. 14 See Bucht, Gottfries, Lundin (2002) for a thorough explanation of how we solve the model. In our baseline simulation, we take the period to be one year, and set the parameter values as follows: 
. Demand shocks are taken to be permanent and cost shocks follow an autoregressive process with autoregressive parameter 0.7. Bucht, Gottfries, Lundin (2002) discuss and motivate these parameter values. Also, they show that while the preference for smooth dividends ( ) γ is important for these results, the qualitative results are robust to modest changes other parameter values.
where,
is the price of the firm relative to the market price, t w is wage cost,
is production relative to capital stock, t y ∆ is the growth of market demand, and t k ∆ is investment (the change of the log of the capital stock) which is assumed to be predetermined.
Here and below lower case letters denote logarithms.
According to equation (5) costs have a big effect on the price but the effects of lagged production and the change in demand are small. 15 This result is due to two opposing effects on the price from demand shocks. With capital stock predetermined, high demand implies a movement along the upward-sloping marginal cost schedule, which puts upward pressure on the price, but at the same time higher cash flow gives the firm financial resources to lower the price and invest in customer stock. As it turns out, these two effects largely cancel out, and the price is not much affected by demand.
According to our model, predetermined investment should have a large positive effect on the price. When investment is high, the financially constrained firm is forced to raise the price and cut back on investment in market share in order to finance ongoing investments in capital stock.
The investment equation (6) is less original. Higher wage costs reduce investment and there is a substantial accelerator effect of demand. Ceteris paribus, high investment in the current period reduces the need to invest tomorrow. The theoretically derived decision rules for price and investment form the starting point for our empirical analysis.
Data and Variables
The data used in this study is drawn from three different sources. The first is a newly sector is constructed. The investigation is limited to the manufacturing sector. This is by far the largest sector in Sweden -it accounts for about 60% of the industrial gross productionand it has a more complete coverage in the database -more than 86% of the observations
The adjustment cost parameter, c, is set to 0.8, broadly in line with estimates by Whited (1992) , Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995) and Lindberg (2000) . 15 By construction, the coefficient on the lagged customer stock (market share) and the coefficient on the change in demand are equal: it does not matter for the firm whether it has more customers or each customer buys a larger quantity.
originate from manufacturing. Each observation in the data set corresponds to a particular plant a given year but in 78% of the observations there is one plant per firm, so in practice, the panel can be seen as a panel of firms.
The second source is a database which contains accounting data for manufacturing firms in Sweden. This database, also provided by Statistics Sweden, contains income statements, information on the destination of sales, and balance sheet information. It is used to calculate the ratio of exports to total sales and the debt to asset ratio. Unfortunately we do not have identification numbers that allow us to match individual plants and firms, so these ratios are calculated on the industry level.
Finally, we use industry data from Statistics Sweden and from the STAN database at OECD.
The data used to construct the variables are plant specific, industry specific, and aggregate data for manufacturing, sometimes in combination. In general, the variables are constructed using the most disaggregated data available. Producer price, wage cost and output are pure plant specific variables. The capital stock is calculated from plant specific investment, but industry specific ratios are used to generate starting values. The market price is a mixture of plant specific, industry specific and aggregate variables. The demand variable is constructed from industry aggregates at the 2-digit and 5-digit level.
Several variables are constructed as weighted averages of original series in logs. We use fixed weights because the number of time periods is small and the shares are intended to measure general characteristics of the industry (exposure to foreign competition etc.) rather than developments in particular years.
As will be described in detail below, the capital stock is calculated using the perpetual inventory method starting in 1989. In order for capital stocks to be constructed in the same way for all plants, plants that are not ongoing throughout the entire sample period are excluded. Also, industries with less than four plants at the five-digit level are removed. The reason for this exclusion is that plants in industries with very few competitors are either oligopolies or monopolies, which makes the customer market model less applicable, or they compete primarily with foreign producers, for which only aggregated price data is available. Production ( it q ): Production is measured as the value of total sales deflated by the plant specific producer price. 17 For each plant, we use the industry number that is observed for the longest time period. 18 In fact, less than half the price data comes from plant-specific unit values. Still, very detailed information about product classifications and disaggregate producer price data are used to construct the other prices, so the index should contain substantial information. The consequences of measurement errors are discussed at length in the next section. 19 Variations in overtime are relatively small in Sweden, see Carlsson (2003) . 20 This problem is discussed by Basu (2000) .
Investment is the log difference of the capital stock and hence we need to calculate the level of the capital stock. The capital stock is computed from investment data using the perpetual inventory method, applied separately to machinery and buildings:
Real investment in machinery and buildings, Market price ( )
The market price should reflect the prices set by plant i's competitors. In a customer market, a price higher than the market price leads to loss of customers. It seems plausible that larger competitors are more important; the firm is more likely to loose customers if a ''leading'' firm, with many customers in the market, sets a low price. In the original Phelps-Winter (1970) model, customers are assumed to be generally uninformed about prices, but they randomly meet, compare prices, and switch to the supplier with the lower price. This makes it more probable that they compare with the price of a large competitor. Also, large firms have more resources for marketing. Therefore, we construct an average producer price for domestic competitors of firm i, it p , as the mean producer price in the industry at the 5-digit level, excluding plant i's producer price, and weighting each plant's price with its share of total sales.
To construct a relevant market price we must take into account that Sweden is a very open economy. Many firms sell a large share of their output foreign markets and they 21 In this case, industries are classified according to the SNI69 system. There are 8 industries at the 2-digit level (31-38). 22 Industry data on capital stock and gross output has kindly been provided by Mikael Carlsson. 23 The geometric depreciation rate for machinery is calculated as the declining balance rate (assumed to be equal for all manufacturing) divided by industry specific service lives. The estimated declining balance rate is set to 1.65 and the depreciation for industrial buildings is set to 0.031, from the BEA\ publication ''Improved Estimates of Fixed Reproducible Tangible Wealth, 1929 -1995 '', by Katz and Herman (1997 . The industry specific estimated average service lives of machinery are collected from the OECD publication ''Methods Used by OECD Countries to Measure Stocks of Fixed Capital' ' (1993) .
compete with foreign suppliers in the domestic market. The average market price, which is relevant for plant i, is defined as:
( 8) The domestic part of the market price is the weighted sum of the average industry producer price it p , defined above, and the industry (3-digit level) import price i mt p . 24 The weight m v is industry specific (3-digit level) import penetration, defined as the ratio of imports to apparent consumption (gross output plus import minus export in 1990, collected from OECD's STAN industrial data base).
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The foreign part of the market price is weighted by the export share, j s . The export share is the sample period mean of the industry (5-digit level) share of foreign sales in total sales, calculated from the firm database. The foreign price 
The change in domestic demand, Summary statistics for all variables are shown in the Appendix, Table A1 .
Empirical Specification
The empirical specification follows the theoretical model closely. The price setting rule to be estimated is:
and the equation for investment is analogous. We do not attempt to measure productivity for individual plants but let productivity and other omitted factors be captured by a plant specific constant term i a , industry-specific (3-digit level) trends mt t , and firm-specific shocks it ε .
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There are no simultaneous decisions in the theoretical model. Time-to build makes the capital stock predetermined, lagged production is predetermined and the wage and market demand are exogenous. Still, instrument variables have to be used for two reasons. The second reason to use instruments has to do with the presence of plant-specific effects and predetermined, but endogenous variables on the right hand side. Shocks to prices and investment affect output and the capital stock in subsequent periods, so these variables are 26 According to equation (1) not strictly exogenous. When the time dimension is short and predetermined but endogenous variables appear on the right hand side in the equation, the within-groups transformation will not produce consistent estimates. For the within-groups estimator to be consistent, the regressors must be orthogonal to the entire sequence of disturbances. This is a reasonable assumption for demand, but clearly not for production and investment.
The problems caused by measurement errors, predetermined variables and unobserved plant-specific effects can be solved by instrumental variables. To be valid, the instruments must be uncorrelated with the measurement errors and the firm-specific shocks in all time periods. At the same time they must be relevant, i. e. correlated with the regressors. In our view, it does not make sense to include a lot of lagged variables and other ad hoc instruments.
Randomly chosen instruments are as likely to be correlated with the measurement errors -or the unobserved shocks -as with the true variables they are supposed to instrument. Instead, we chose a parsimonious set of instruments based on prior reasoning.
In our baseline estimation, we use industry-wide aggregates as instruments. 
28 Instruments of this type have been used in panels of aggregate data, for example in Levitt and Snyder (1997) and Harrigan (1997) . 29 Obviously, unobserved industry shocks may make industry aggregates invalid instruments.
is used as instrument for it k ∆ , where N is the number of plants in the same industry.
Analogous instruments are constructed for 0 it it p w − and
The change in demand, jt y ∆ , is assumed to be exogenous and measured without errors. 31 Thus, our baseline estimation is done by GMM using instrument set I in Table 1 .
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In the above specification, the trend variable captures the general productivity trend in the industry. An alternative is to think of the productivity trend as stochastic, in which case it is appropriate to estimate the equations in first differences with industry specific constants:
Again, we use the corresponding aggregate instruments, denoted instrument set II in Table 1 .
A third alternative is to use lagged firm level variables as instruments. Since we have predetermined but endogenous variables on the right hand side, we must estimate the model in first differences and only lags of relatively high order are appropriate as instruments. The hand side variables, so these cannot be used as instruments. We have to use lags of higher order and this leads us to use instrument set III in Table 1 .
Another question is whether to include time dummies. Arguments can be made for and against the inclusion of time dummies. Our prime concern is price and investment behaviour over the business cycle and time dummies will sweep up all the variation that is related to the general business cycle. Much of the interesting variation in the data is eliminated and we are left with only cyclical differences between firms and sectors. The result may be a low signalto-noise ratio and it may be difficult to find relevant instruments for the right hand side variables. On the other hand, the number of time periods is small, so there is a risk that results without time dummies are driven by a few unobserved macro shocks, which affected 30 Note that these "aggregate instruments" are not quite the same as aggregate industry data. First, the firm itself is excluded, which matters if the firm has a relatively large share of industry output. Second, the variables are not weighted by output but unweighted averages across firms; data for each of the other firms is assumed to be equally informative. 31 Since the variable is an aggregate, plant-specific measurement errors are likely to cancel out. In the sensitivity analysis we use foreign demand to instrument for y ∆ and find qualitatively unchanged results.
many firms in the same direction. Inclusion of time dummies is a way to check whether this is the case. For these reasons we report results with and without time dummies.
Results
First stage regressions show that aggregate instruments (instrument sets I and II) are relevant,
i. e. they are correlated with the right hand variables (see the appendix tables A2-A3). As can be expected, the instruments have less explanatory power when we include time dummies. In particular, there are indications of weak instruments for investment when we include time dummies: Shea R 2 falls to 0.001 or lower and the F value hovers near 10.
As one might expect, lagged firm specific variables (instrument set III) are much weaker instruments (Table A4 ). Most importantly, when time dummies are included, lagged variables do a very poor job predicting investment. This is true both for lagged firm specific variables and lagged aggregate instruments, and it is hardly surprising since we know that investment is quite volatile. Who can predict investments of an individual firm three years from now? Since investment plays a central role in our theory we will focus on estimates with aggregate instruments as defined in the previous section.
In Table 2 we report our baseline price and investment equations which have been estimated using alternative estimation techniques. Columns 1-3 show within-groups estimates with different combinations of industry trends and time dummies. In columns 4-7 we show equations in first differences to take account of possible stochastic trends. Again we experiment with alternative combinations of industry trends (here industry-specific constants) and time dummies. In the final column 8 we use only lagged firm level variables as instruments.
The qualitative results are similar across the different regressions. Wage costs have a clear positive effect on prices: approximately half the wage increase is passed through into prices. In most cases, the level of production at the start of the period has no significant effect on the price, and the change in demand has a small negative effect on the price. 33 The coefficient for investment is strongly significant and quantitatively large: a one standard deviation (0.11) increase in it k ∆ raises the price about 10 %.
We view these results as supportive of our theoretical model. As predicted by the model, cost shocks have a large positive effect on prices but higher demand does not raise the price. In fact, there is a small negative effect on the price of the change in demand: the 33 Recall that these two variables should have the same (small) coefficient according to our theory. markup appears to be even more countercyclical than our theoretical model predicts. The effect of investment is predicted by our model of price setting in a customer market when firms are financially constrained.
Turning to the investment equation in the lower part of Table 2 , we see that higher wage costs reduce investment and there is a clear accelerator effect of demand, though significantly smaller than in the theoretical model suggests. The coefficient for investment was expected to be negative because high investment in the current period reduces the need to invest tomorrow. There is some evidence of this, but in most cases there is no significant effect.
One possible reason is that there may be omitted variables which cause positive serial correlation in investment.
Sensitivity Analysis
To check the robustness of these results, we report some alternative estimates in tables 3-7.
We first consider some alternative ways of constructing the sample. Then we turn to some alternative specifications of equations and instruments. On the whole, we find that our qualitative results are robust.
Elimination of outliers:
To investigate whether spurious effects of outliers drive the results, observations that lie outside ten times the inter-quartile range above the 75th percentile and below 25th percentile were excluded. The results, reported in Table 3 , are very similar to the baseline estimation.
Unbalanced panel: To see that the result is not due to sample selection bias caused by the selection of only ongoing plants, the equations were estimated on an unbalanced sample. and the investment effect is reduced, one may conclude that the effect of investment on the price is spurious. As can be seen in Table 6 , the lagged demand term has a small negative effect (though not significant) and all other coefficients are very similar to the baseline estimation. The positive correlation between investment and prices does not appear to be spurious for this reason.
Reverse causation? Another possibility is that high prices cause high investment rather than the reverse. To test this, we include the relative price in period t in the equation for investment in period t+1. Under the maintained hypothesis that investment takes time, we would expect a positive coefficient if there is reverse causation. Table 9 , the wage and investment coefficients do indeed rise with the aggregation level. The coefficient for investment increases from 0.0390 in the plant level estimation, to 0.5898 at the 2-digit industry level. These findings are consistent with the notion that the microeconomic data contains substantial measurement errors and hence it is important to use appropriate instruments when estimating behavior using microeconomic data.
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Less aggregate instruments. As a final check of robustness we constructed aggregate instruments at the 3-digit level (74 industries) instead of the 2-digit level used in the baseline estimates. More disaggregate instruments should capture more true cross-firm variation but could also contain more noise. The resulting estimates in Table 10 are similar to the baseline for price equation but a little weaker for investment when time-dummies are included.
Differences between Firms
Firms which have limited access to external finance should be more likely to be financially constrained. Such firms should be less likely to raise prices when demand increases, and they should be more likely to raise the price when there are ongoing capital investments that need financing. 37 This suggests a way to test the theory by dividing firms into those which à priori can be considered more likely to be financially constrained and those which are less likely to foreign demand and productivity of the individual Swedish firm. But unless technology shocks are perfectly correlated across the world, foreign demand should still be less correlated with domestic technology and hence a better demand indicator. Then the use of foreign demand as instrument should raise the coefficient on y ∆ . In fact, the opposite happens. 36 This exercise is simply made to see if there are indications of measurement errors in the variables. As discussed previously, it is problematic to use within-group transformations (without external instruments) in a short panel with predetermined variables. 37 When there is no preference for smooth dividends ( ) 0 = γ the firm maximizes conventional present value. In this case, the price responds in conventional way to demand shocks and prices are not much affected by investment -see simulations in Bucht-Gottfries-Lundin (2002). be constrained. We try to identify constrained firms in three different ways, by classifying firms according to size, capital intensity, and the level of debt.
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Size: Ceteris paribus, we would expect smaller firms to have more limited access to external capital, and hence their prices should be more sensitive to fluctuations in investment. 39 On the other hand, small firms may generally be in a more competitive situation and this may limit their discretion with respect to prices. To investigate whether behavior differs between firms of different size, the plants were grouped into small and large plants according to the number of employees. A small plant is defined as one with less than the median number of employees. In Table 11 we see that the effect of demand is smaller (more negative) and the positive effect of investment is stronger in industries with small plants, but the differences are not statistically significant.
Capital intensity:
One may argue that the positive effect of investment on price should be stronger for plants with capital intensive production. A firm with a small capital stock relative to output should not need to raise the price even when there is a large rate of change in capital stock since investment expenditure will still be small relative to cash flow. 40 To examine this, we divided industries into two groups depending on the capital output ratio. The investment effect is smaller for less capital intensive industries (Table 11) . Again, this is consistent with the implications of the theoretical model, but the difference is not statistically significant.
Access to debt:
A third and more direct approach is to use observed debt ratios as indicators of financial constraints and divide the sample into industries with high and low debt to asset ratios. Firms with high average levels of debt over the whole period apparently have better access to the credit market, e. g. because they have more tangible assets or better financial relations, and thus they should be less likely to become financially constrained.
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Also, a low level of debt may signal aversion against external financing by owners who want full control of their firms -"family businesses". Again this would make those firms more dependent on internal financing.
Thus we divide the sample into industries (5-digit level) with low debt to assets ratios (less than the 33.33 percentile), medium debt to assets ratios (more than the 33.33 percentile 38 In this section we focus on the results with aggregate instruments and no time dummies (specifications 1 and 5 in Table 2 ). We do this to limit the number of results to be reported and because some equations with time dummies were poorly identified. Also, inclusion of time dummies seems less important when the purpose is to compare results across groups of firms. 39 As discussed above, most plants are in fact firms, so small plants would typically be small firms. 40 Remember that investment is defined as the log difference of the capital stock.
and less than the 66.66 percentile), and high debt to assets ratios (higher than the 66.66 percentile), during the sample period. Debt is short-term plus long-term debt and assets is the balance sheet total, collected from the firm database. Averages for the whole sample period are used to distinguish industries which normally have high debt from those which normally have low debt.
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In this case, we find striking differences ( Table 12 ). The price response to demand shifts is much more negative in industries with low average debt to asset ratios and the effect of investment on the price is large and significant only for industries with low debt to asset ratios. These results are consistent with the idea that firms with low average debt ratios have worse access to financial markets and hence they are more likely to be financially constrained.
Conclusion
In this paper we investigated pricing behavior of Swedish manufacturing firms using a large dataset for manufacturing plants. In order to construct measures of demand, costs, and competitors' prices we exploited the openness of the Swedish economy. Foreign demand and prices can be considered to be quite exogenous relative to unobserved shocks affecting Swedish firms. Different industries are more or less export oriented and this creates considerable cross industry variation in demand. From this point of view, our foreign demand variable can be seen as a small open economy alternative to the demand instruments used by e. g. Hall (1988), Shea (1993) and Ghosal (2000) . Also, because different industries are differently exposed to foreign competition, exchange rate variations generate considerable cross industry variation in competitiveness, measured as wage cost relative to competitors'
prices. This allows us to investigate how prices respond to wage costs and competitors' prices.
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Wage costs were found to have a large and significant effect on prices, whereas demand has a small, sometimes even negative effect on prices. While such a differential response of prices to costs and demand is commonly found in aggregate and industry price studies this is, 41 Chirinko and Schaller (1995) discuss different structural reasons why firms may have differential acess to financial markets. 42 If a firm has temporarily high debt in a particular year, this may be taken as an indication that it has gone through hard times and is unable to issue shares, so it has accumulated debt and is more financially constrained. But firms in industries which regularly have a high level of debt should have better access to credit, e. g. because capital is more tangible and liquid and thus more useful as collateral (higher θ ). This makes it less likely that they become financially constrained. 43 In a relatively closed economy, wage costs and competitors' prices will be closely correlated and it is hard to find an instrument that differentiates between them.
to our knowledge, the first time it has been shown for a large microeconomic dataset. 44 This differential response is predicted by our theoretical model. Cost and demand shocks both imply higher marginal cost at the initial price, but they have opposite financial consequences.
Higher costs make firms more financially constrained, reinforcing the price increase due to higher marginal cost. Higher demand makes firms less financially constrained, counteracting the effects of higher marginal cost. With higher profits, firms have the financial resources to compete more aggressively for customers and this explains the weak effects of demand on prices.
Our most important result was that investment is an important determinant of prices at the microeconomic level. This new result supports the model of price setting in customer markets developed by Bucht, Gottfries and Lundin (2002) . High ongoing real capital investment, which needs to be financed, makes it more likely that a firm becomes financially constrained and is forced to cut investment in customer stock by setting a high price. The effect of investment on the price was found to be lower for plants which have better access to the credit market, as revealed by their higher average level of debt.
In our theoretical model, the markup falls initially and then recovers after a permanent demand shock. 45 There is a substantial literature that tries to measure cyclical markup fluctuations. With a Cobb-Douglas production function, marginal cost is proportional to average cost, so many authors measure the markup as price relative to average cost or the inverse of the labor share. These studies typically find a procyclical markup. A problem with these results is that the finding of a procyclical markup is very much due to the well known procyclicality of labor productivity. Recent research gives strong indications that the observed procyclicality of labor productivity is due to fluctuations in factor utilization.
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Presumably, fluctuations in factor utilization arise because of adjustment costs that prevent firms from always having just the right amount of capital and labor. But in the presence of adjustment costs, average cost is not a good measure of marginal cost. 47 Bils (1987) 
, so when there is a demand shock and Q increases with K predetermined and little change in P, marginal cost increases and the markup falls. 46 See Carlsson (2003) for Swedish evidence and references to the international literature. 47 In fact, adjustment costs for labor make the short run marginal cost curve steeper than it would be without adjustment costs. An alternative explanation of procyclical labor productivity is increasing returns to scale which also implies that average cost is a poor measure of marginal cost.
Woodford (1991) postulated a production function with overhead labor. Both studies found the markup to be countercyclical. 48 In the present study we disregarded adjustment costs for labor because this would increase the number of state variables in our model and we did not use productivity data. Our ambition was not to measure the markup, but to estimate behavioral equations -decision rules -relating price and investment to exogenous and predetermined variables. 49 Our results imply a lagged price response to demand shocks, broadly consistent with Shea (1993) , who found that the full response occurs after about one year, and Bils and Klenow (1998) , who found that price/cost margins fall significantly after a demand shock. According to our model, firms which are flooded with liquidity because of rising sales are less anxious to raise the price. After a year or so, investment picks up, and they become more financially constrained and raise prices. The result is a lagged price response to demand shocks and the lag should correspond to the decision and implementation lags in investment, typically thought to be between one and two years.
Such lagged response may play an important role in the macroeconomic adjustment to aggregate demand shocks. Impulse-response functions from macroeconomic VAR models show very little movement of wages and prices in the first year after a monetary shock (see e.
g. Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1999)). The lagged price response that our model implies may be an important component of such slow aggregate price adjustment. Obviously, we need a complete model of the interaction between wages and prices in order to fully understand aggregate price adjustment. Notes: See Table 2 . 
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Notes: See Table 2 . Difference specifications with only lagged instruments are not reported because they were poorly identified. Notes: See Table 2 . First stage regression reveal poor identification for specifications corresponding to 3 and 6-8 in Table 2 . These results are not reported. is the measure of instrument relevance proposed by Shea (1997) . F-test is the test of joint significance of the excluded instruments. The number in the first row corresponds to the specification (1-8) in Table A1 . Notes: See Table A1 .
